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Abstract—Rounding confidence score is considered trivial but
a simple and effective countermeasure to stop gradient descent
based image reconstruction attacks. However, its capability in
the face of more sophisticated reconstruction attacks is an
uninvestigated research area. In this paper, we prove that, the face
reconstruction attacks based on composite faces can reveal the in-
efficiency of rounding policy as countermeasure. We assume that,
the attacker takes advantage of face composite parts which helps
the attacker to get access to the most important features of the
face or decompose it to the independent segments. Afterwards,
decomposed segments are exploited as search parameters to
create a search path to reconstruct optimal face. Face composition
parts enable the attacker to violate the privacy of face recognition
models even with a blind search. However, we assume that, the
attacker may take advantage of random search to reconstruct
the target face faster. The algorithm is started with random
composition of face parts as initial face and confidence score
is considered as fitness value. Our experiments show that, since
the rounding policy as countermeasure can’t stop the random
search process, current face recognition systems are extremely
vulnerable against such sophisticated attacks. To address this
problem, we successfully test Face Detection Score Filtering
(FDSF) as a countermeasure to protect the privacy of training
data against proposed attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of machine learning-as-a-service (MLaaS)
[1,2] online pre-trained models are increasingly exploited in
applications like facial recognition [3,4]. The accuracy of
trained facial recognition models has been one and only
priority in the past decade. In recent years however, preserving
the privacy of people whose personal photo has been used
as training data became a major priority. In the context of
these services, an imminent threat is that, the attacker can
reconstruct a recognizable image of a person, given the name
of corresponding person and the confidence score returned
by API. In this case, breaching the sensitive, confidential or
protected data is no longer considered as a financial risk,
but it may lead to life threatening danger for victims. In a
reconstruction attack recently introduced by Fredrikson et al.
[5], adversarial access to a trained facial recognition model is
abused to reconstruct the face of an individual given the corre-
sponding name or identifier via gradient descent optimization.
However, obtained results by Fredrickson et al. [5] showed
that, a reasonable rounding level can completely obviate the
threat of gradient descent based attacks. Unfortunately, this
trivial countermeasure could not guarantee the privacy of
personal images when it comes to deal with more sophisticated
attacks. In this paper, we show that, the attacker can impose
a significant threat against face recognition systems by tak-
ing advantage of optimization techniques like random search
which are not dependent to gradient descent. We disclose
the imminent threat of face composition parts as it helps the
attacker to form a state space of faces to search a composite
face with maximum confidence score. As a result, rounding the
confidence score as countermeasure can not stop the attacker
and training data would no longer remain private. The strength
of proposed attack is that, rather than trying to reach an
identical reconstructed face, it tries to synthesize an instance
which resembles the target face. This policy helps the attacker
to reach an approximation of a difficult problem by a nearby
problem that is easier to solve. Our observations show that, this
type of attack needs more sophisticated countermeasures. To
tackle this formidable threat, we propose Face Detection Score
Filtering (FDSF) as an effective countermeasure. The main
idea of FDSF is to return high confidence score to face which
get low Face Detection Score (FDS). The intuition behind
FDSF is that, the composite faces get lower FDS comparing
to real faces. Returning high confidence score to low quality
faces can fool the attacker to form a wrong search path. The
experimental results show that, the proposed attack cannot
be nullified by rounding policy as countermeasure. Besides,
the obtained reconstructed faces significantly resemble the
target faces in terms of 17 face characteristics measured by
an independent face recognition system. Our contributions are
as follows.
• We show the potential of composite faces to impose
a significant threat against privacy of face recognition
systems.
• We prove that, random search can challenge the efficiency
of rounding policy as countermeasure.
• We propose Face Detection Score Filtering (FDSF) as
an efficient countermeasure against proposed face recon-
struction attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the related works. Section III demonstrates how
composite faces can be used to threat the privacy of face
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recognition systems . Section IV explains the proposed coun-
termeasure. Section V presents the experimental results and
finally section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Attackers may select different approaches to violate the
privacy of training data and get access to sensitive user data
or key information about the model architecture. These ap-
proaches are categorized to model inversion and membership
inference. In this section, we review researches related to each
category.
A. Model Inversion attacks
Model inversion attacks are designed to reveal sensitive
information about the training data used in training phase.
Given the class label, the attacker attempts to create an input
that maximizes the corresponding confidence score of the
target class. In case of a facial recognition system, such
attacks are called reconstruction attack in which, the attacker
can produce an approximate image of one of the participants
whose image was used in the training phase given the name
or identifier. In general, image reconstruction attacks fall into
two categories: optimization-based and training-based.
1) Optimization-based Reconstruction Attack :
Optimization-based data reconstruction has a long history in
Machine Learning [7]. Lee et al. [6] attacked a multilayer
feedforward mapping network using the gradient of Lyapunov
function and solving inverse mapping of a continuous
function. Since the mapping from the output space to the
input space is a one to many mapping, its considered as an
ill-posed problem. To address this problem, Lu et al. [8]
formulated the inverse problem as a nonlinear programming
(NLP) problem. Mahendran et al. [9] proposed a general
framework to reconstruct an image x from its computer
vision features such as HOG [10] and SIFT [11]. Fredrikson
et al. [12] proposed the first end-to-end case study of
differential privacy in a medical application based on gradient
maximization of the class score. Fredrikson et al. [5] took
advantage of Denoising Autoencoders (DAE) and sharpening
filters as the prior in the reconstruction attack. Mahendran et
al. [13] utilized a regularized energy minimization framework
and natural pre-images to reconstruct an image from its
representation.
2) Training-based Reconstruction attack: Given a target
model T training based model inversion attacks try to train
a new neural network S to approximate the mapping between
confidence scores and input images. Dosovitskiy et al. [14]
trained convolutional networks to reconstruct images from dif-
ferent shallow representations including HOG, SIFT and LBP.
Dosovitskiy et al. [15] used perceptual similarity of images
using extracted deep features using autoencoder, variational
autoencoder and deep convolutional networks. Nash et al. [16]
used flexible autoregressive neural density for the inversion
of supervised representations. Yang et al. [17] used an aux-
iliary training data for the sake of model inversion, which
is considered as a resembling version to the original training
data. They also showed that, partial predictions obtained from
target training data can be used to construct a comprehensive
inversion model.
B. Membership Inference Attack
Given the name or identification of a person, the goal of
membership attack is to reveal whether or not the information
of this person has been used as training data. For example,
inference attacks against a cancer diagnosis system can be
exploited by the adversary to identify if a specific person
is a cancer diagnosed case. One of the first researches tried
to show the eminence of inference attacks was proposed by
Homer et al. [18]. Backes et al. [19] studied the viability of
membership inference to challenge the privacy of individuals
contributing their microRNA expressions to collect training
datasets. Homer et al. [20] focused on attacks on genomic
research studies, where an attacker tries to infer the member-
ship of a specific person’s data within an aggregate genomic
dataset, or aggregate locations [21]. Shokri et al. [22] took
advantage of multiple shadow models that approximate the
behavior of the target model by training the attack model on
the labeled inputs and outputs of the shadow models. Hayes
et al. [23] studied to what extent the membership inference
attacks can be successful against generative models. Truex
et al. [24] studied the model vulnerability through proposing
a generalized formulation of a black-box membership infer-
ence attacks using different model combinations and multiple
datasets. Melis et al. [25] studied the possibility of successful
membership inference attack in distributed learning systems.
III. COMPOSITE FACE RECONSTRUCTION ATTACK
In this section, we show that, how the attackers can take
advantage of composite faces to design more sophisticated
attacks. Among all possible attack strategies [32], we discuss
Random Search as the most imminent one.
A. Composite Faces
Construction of the composite faces has a long history in
crime detection [29]. In this paper, we assume that, the attacker
takes advantage of available face composite softwares to col-
lect sufficient face composition parts to design an efficient face
reconstruction attack. We suppose that, the attacker collects the
face composition parts from published softwares. To simulate
such kind of threat, we used a free software called PortraitPad
[26]. The collected face composition dataset includes one base
head, 100 eyes, 73 lips, 34 noses , 50 brows , 25 hairs ,
10 glasses and 10 mustaches. Figure 1 shows some of the
collected composition parts.
B. Attack Specifications
In this section, we define the specifications of face re-
construction attacks based on composite faces. In such so-
phisticated attacks, the exact reconstruction of target face is
impossible. Rather, the goal of attacker is to find the most
similar face to the target face. This relaxation of the problem
makes the threat even more dangerous. The main operation
Fig. 1. Base head and seven face composition parts.
Fig. 2. The architecture of proposed GAN-based face reconstruction attack.
in this context is to search the state space to maximize the
confidence score returned from the target retrieval model as
shown in Figure 2. We can express this operation as follows.
min
Xr,Xt∈R
| Xr − Xt |. Where, Xr is reconstructed face and
Xt is target face. We suppose that, the attack has no any
information regarding the target model structure. That’s why
we can consider it as a black box attack. No matter what’s
the type of target model. It can be supposed as either a face
recognition model or face retrieval model. In either cases, such
kinds of attacks can be considered as a significant threat to
challenge the privacy of data, since the attacker tries to search
and reconstruct the most similar face to the target one. Among
all possible attack strategies to search the latent space, we
discuss random search.
C. Random Search
Random search [31] is kind of optimization methods which
can find the global extrema without optimizing the gradient
of problem. Random search was proposed by Anderson
[35] and then extended by Rastrigin [36] and Karnopp [37].
Random search techniques are very useful when there is
several local extrema in the state space. In case of using
the face composition parts for face reconstruction attack, the
attacker may select this approach to avoid rounding policy as
counter measure. Suppose N =
{
a, b, c, d, e, f, g
}
denotes the
number of face composition parts. The size of state space or
number of possible synthesized faces is a ∗ b ∗ c ∗ d ∗ e ∗ f ∗ g.
It’s clear that, in worst case, the attacker needs to search all
the state space which is so time consuming. Even the worst
scenario from attacker point of view sounds very daunting
from privacy point of view because at the end attacker would
find the most similar synthesized face to the target face.
Needless to say that, random search makes this process easier
for the attacker. However, we need to prove that random
search can guarantee the convergence. We can define random
search problem as follows. Given a target model f from Rn
to R and state space S, we search for a point x in S which
maximizes confidence score returned from f . The conceptual
steps for random search are as follows [31] .
Step1 Find x0 in S and set k = 0.
Step2 Generate ξ from the sample space (Rn,B, µk) .
Step3 Set xk+l = D(xk, ξk), choose µk+l, set k = k + 1 and
return to Step 1.
The map D with domain S × R and range S satisfies the
following condition.
(H1) f(D(x, ξ) 6 f(x) and if ξ ∈ S, f(D(x, ξ)) 6 f(ξ)
The µk are probability measures corresponding to distribution
functions defined on R
THEOREM 1. (Convergence Theorem [31]) Suppose
that f is a measurable function, S is a measurable subset
of Rn and (H1) is satisfied. Let
{
xk
}∞
k=0
be a sequence
generated by the algorithm. Then
limk→∞ P
[
xk ∈ R,M
]
= 1
Where, P
[
xk ∈ R,M
]
is the probability that at step k, the
point xk generated by the algorithm is in R,M .
PROOF From (H1) it follows that, xk or ξk in R,M
implies that, xk
′ ∈ R,M for all k′ > k + 1. Thus
P
[
xk ∈ R,M
]
= 1−P [xk ∈ S R,M ] > 1− k∏
l=0
(1−µl(R,M ))
(1)
and hence
Fig. 3. The architecture of proposed defense system.
1 > lim
k→∞
P
[
xk ∈ R,M
]
> 1− lim
k→∞
k−1∏
l=0
(1− µl(R,M )) = 1
(2)
1) Stopping criteria: Construction of a sequence
{
xk
}∞
k=0
is the best scenario. However, we must define a stopping
criteria [31] enabling us to stop the algorithm after a finite
number of iterations. Given β ∈ ]0, 1[ we need to find Nβ
such that, P
[
xk /∈ R,M
]
6 β for all k > Nβ , then
P
[
xk /∈ R,M
]
6 (1−m)k (3)
Choosing an integer Nβ >
[
lnβ / ln(1−m)] has the required
property since for k > Nβ it follows that
k >
[
lnβ / ln(1−m).] and hence β 6 (1−m)k.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we explore one potential approach for
developing effective countermeasure against proposed face re-
construction attack based on Maximum Likelihood Estimators.
A. Countermeasure Strategy
In case of using random search, the attacker needs to change
the input parameters of PG-GAN or TL-GAN to find the most
similar face to the target face. As mentioned earlier, PG-GAN
and TL-GAN can’t guarantee high quality images per all input
parameters. The best possible solution to take advantage of this
weakness is to return 100 % confidence score if the submitted
face is detected as the fake face as shown in Figure 3. This
strategy would force the attacker to take wrong search path to
reach the optimal face.
B. Face Detection Score Filtering
For face detection, image patches x of different sizes and
from different positions in the input image are transformed to
eigenspace and the Maximum Likelihood Probability (MLP)
is estimated as follows [38].
P (x) =
exp
(
− 12
∑M
i=1
yi
2
λi
)
(2pi)
M
2
∐M
i=1 λ
1
2
i
· (x) (4)
Where, y is the transformed input image x to eigenspace
and λi is the corresponding eigenvalues, M is the number
of eigenfaces used for estimation, and  approximates the
distance from feature space. For face recognition, the MLP
of similarity between images is calculated as follows [38].
ST (x) = −
[∑MI
i=1
y2I;i
λI;i
+ I(x)
]
+
[∑ME
i=1
y2E;i
λE;i
+ E(x)
]
(5)
Face Detection Score (FDS) is considered as likelihood prob-
ability of detecting a face in input image returned by trained
model. During our experiments, we observed that, Face Detec-
tion Score (FDS) of composite faces is lower than real faces
in majority of cases. Based on this observation, we propose
a voting system which enables the face recognition systems
to detect a composite face. The proposed voting system is
based on comparing the submitted face with a set of randomly
selected real faces. If the submitted face fails to get higher FDS
in µ cases, it’s considered as composite face which has been
submitted for the sake of reconstruction attack, where µ is a
predefined threshold.
C. Face Detection Score Filtering (FDSF)
In case of using random search, the attacker needs to
change the face composition parts to find the most similar
face to the target face. As mentioned earlier, a synthesized
face can’t guarantee high FDS per all input parameters. To
take advantage of this weakness, we return 100 % confidence
score if the submitted face is detected as the fake face. This
strategy would force the attacker to take wrong search path to
reach the optimal face. As a result, the reconstructed face by
the attacker would significantly differ from the target face.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In our experiments, we supposed that, the attacker has
no information regarding the structure of target model. To
reconstruct a target face , the attacker submits a face image
generated by composition parts and the returned confidence
scores from Betaface model [28] is used to search the state
space to find the most similar generated face to target face.
A. Dataset
Betaface [28] enables us to browse the synthesized faces in
wide range of faces. Considering the privacy of retrieved faces,
we decided to limit our evaluations to Celebrities dataset which
contains more than 40k faces of famous people. To evaluate
the proposed countermeasure, we also used WLFDB [33] and
Pubfig [34] datasets.
B. Vulnerability of Face Recognition Systems
In this section, we show that, online face recognition
systems are extremely vulnerable against composite faces.
We show that, even low quality composite faces can re-
ceive a high confidence score from the target model. To
do so, we take advantage of an online face classifier called
Betaface [28] which provides verification (faces comparison)
and identification (faces search) services. The API enables
the developers to extract face general information including
Fig. 4. Synthesized faces and the detected landmarks by target model.
Fig. 5. composite faces and their corresponding retrieved faces.
positions, sizes, angles and 123 face landmarks locations. In
our experiments, we tried to check to what extent a synthesized
face by composition parts can cheat a face recognition system.
Figure 4 shows that, the target model can correctly find the
face landmarks in complete synthesized faces. Partial faces are
even more challenging since they contain only eyes and nose.
Even in this case, the target model has found the eye and
nose landmarks correctly. This experiment reveals that, face
recognition systems are defenseless against composite faces.
Figure 5 shows three composite faces and their correspond-
ing retrieved faces. This experiment proves that, even low
quality composite faces can be recognized by online models
[28] with high confidence score.
C. Attack Evaluation
To evaluate the quality of reconstructed face, we classify
the reconstructed face and target face based on age, gender,
ethnicity, smile and a set of high level face characteristics. To
do so, we take advantage of an online face classifier called
Betaface [28] which provides verification (faces comparison)
and identification (faces search) services. The API enables
the developers to extract face general information including
positions, sizes, angles and 123 face landmarks locations.
Figure 10 shows three different test cases as target faces and
corresponding reconstructed faces.
1) Test case (a): To compare the similarity of target face
(a) and its reconstructed version, 17 different high level
characteristics are used as shown in in Table I, II. Experimental
results show that, 12 characteristics are categorized correctly
the same in target and reconstructed images in test case (a).
The most unexpected result is related to Beard and Mustache.
In both cases, the Betaface has detected mentioned items in
reconstructed image but not in target face. Figure 6 shows the
probability of classification results belonging to test case (a).
2) Test case (b): To compare the similarity of target face
(b) and its reconstructed version, 17 different high level char-
acteristics are used as shown in in Table III, IV. Experimental
results show that, 9 characteristics are categorized correctly
the same in target and reconstructed images in test case (b).
The proposed method has failed to reconstruct the expression
of target face but the detected age is rather close to target
face. Figure 7 shows the probability of classification results
belonging to test case (b).
3) Test case (c): To compare the similarity of target face (c)
and its reconstructed version, 17 different high level character-
istics are used as shown in in Table V, VI. Experimental results
show that, 15 characteristics are categorized correctly the same
in target and reconstructed images in test case (c). Figure 8
shows the probability of classification result belonging to test
case (c). Here, we summarize the experimental results:
• The best returned confidence score at each generation is
significantly higher than previous generation as shown
in part (b) of figure 7. It proves that rounding policy as
countermeasure can not stop evolution based reconstruc-
tion attack.
Fig. 6. Test Case (a) : Classification probabilities.
TABLE I
TEST CASE (A) : TARGET FACE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTED FACE IN TERMS OF 9 FACE CHARACTERISTICS.
Age Arched Eyebrows Bald Beard Big Lips Big Nose Double Chin Gender Narrow Eyes
Reconstructed Face 28 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Male No
Target Face 44 No Yes No No Yes No Male No
TABLE II
TEST CASE (A) : TARGET FACE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTED FACE IN TERMS OF 8 FACE CHARACTERISTICS.
Attractive Bags Under Eyes Expression Mustache Pointy Nose Bushy Eyebrows Bangs Glasses
Reconstructed Face No No Neutral Yes No Yes No No
Target Face No No Neutral No No No No No
Fig. 7. Test Case (b) : Classification probabilities.
TABLE III
TEST CASE (B) : TARGET FACE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTED FACE IN TERMS OF 9 FACE CHARACTERISTICS.
Age Arched Eyebrows Bald Beard Big Lips Big Nose Double Chin Gender Narrow Eyes
Reconstructed Face 24 No No No Yes Yes No Male No
Target Face 33 No No No No No No Male Yes
TABLE IV
TEST CASE (B) : TARGET FACE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTED FACE IN TERMS OF 8 FACE CHARACTERISTICS.
Attractive Bags Under Eyes Expression Mustache Pointy Nose Bushy Eyebrows Bangs Glasses
Reconstructed Face Yes No Neutral No No Yes Yes No
Target Face No No Smile No No No No No
Fig. 8. Test Case (c) : Classification probabilities.
TABLE V
TEST CASE (C) : TARGET FACE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTED FACE IN TERMS OF 9 FACE CHARACTERISTICS.
Age Arched Eyebrows Bald Beard Big Lips Big Nose Double Chin Gender Narrow Eyes
Reconstructed Face 34 No Yes No No Yes No Male No
Target Face 45 No Yes No No No No Male No
TABLE VI
TEST CASE (C) : TARGET FACE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTED FACE IN TERMS OF 8 FACE CHARACTERISTICS.
Attractive Bags Under Eyes Expression Mustache Pointy Nose Bushy Eyebrows Bangs Glasses
Reconstructed Face No No Neutral No No No No Yes
Target Face No No Neutral No No No No Yes
Fig. 9. The impact of proposed countermeasure on convergence of latent space search : Confidence scores versus number of reconstructed faces.
• Reconstructed faces are similar to target faces in terms
of the majority of face characteristics.
• Proposed method fails to reconstruct a face with exactly
the same age as target face. Researchers might exploit
this fact to devise new countermeasures against evolution
based face reconstruction attacks.
D. Evaluation of Countermeasure
To evaluate the proposed countermeasure, we supposed that,
the attacker uses a search-based method like random search
to avoid rounding policy as countermeasure. To simulate the
attack, we took advantage of face comparison tool of Betaface
[28] which returns the confidence score of face similarities.
To test the FDSF to detect the fake faces, we compare each
composite face against six randomly chosen real faces. The
random real faces are selected from WLFDB [33] and Pubfig
[34] datasets. Our experiments show that, the composite faces
would always get low rank in terms of FDS as shown in
Figure 10. In this figure, each label represents the ranking of
corresponding face in terms of FDS. In all the experiments, we
set the threshold to µ = 5 which means that, submitted faces
are detected as composite face if their FDS rank is less than 5.
Consequently, a high confidence score is returned to the user.
Our experimental results show that, FDSF is very successful
to fool the attacker by returning high confidence scores for
detected fake faces as shown in Figure 9. Figure 11 shows
Fig. 10. Each composite face is compared with real faces in terms of FDS. Each label shows the ranking of corresponding face. Part (a): composite face got
the lowest rank. Part(b) and Part (c) : The composite faces outperformed only one real face. Part(d): The real face got high rank.
three different cases which each one includes target face,
reconstructed face without countermeasure and reconstructed
face with countermeasure. To measure the impact of proposed
countermeasure, we calculated the similarity of both recon-
structed faces with and without countermeasure as shown in
Figure 12. The results show that, the proposed countermeasure
can significantly decrease the similarity of reconstructed face
and target face.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that, rounding policy as a coun-
termeasure can not guarantee the privacy of face recognition
models. Composite faces have been used for many decades
for good reasons. However, they can easily be exploited to
violate the privacy of individuals whose face images have
been used as training data. We showed the vulnerability of
face recognition systems to preserve the privacy of training
data. We also proposed a new countermeasure to stop proposed
face reconstruction attack based on face detection score (FDS).
Our experiments showed that, the composite faces fail to
outperform real faces in terms of FDS in majority of cases. We
showed that, the proposed counter measure is able to detect
the composite faces using a voting system to compare the FDS
of submitted faces and a set of random real faces.
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